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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CORA MILLETT, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
VS. ) 
) 
CLARK CLINIC CORPORATION, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
Case No. 16542 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a malpractice action instituted by Cora Millett 
for damages caused by the Clark Clinic Corporation in performing 
two breast surgery operations.· 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for plaintiff's failure 
to comply with § 78-14-8, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) was 
granted by Order of the district court judge on June 11, 1979. 
Plaintiff therein appeals from that Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff had initial breast surgery performed by 
the agents of the defendant on September 23, 1976. Complications 
subsequently arose and such complications are the bases for this 
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action and required further surgery on November 2, 1976. On 
August 17, 1978, Notice of Intent to Commence Action was served 
on the defendant, and the Complaint was filed on January 18, 
1979 in the Fourth District Court. 
ISSUE 
Whether the general tolling provisions of § 78-12-41, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) prevent dismissal of Cora 
Millett's Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS ACTION WAS COMMENCED 
WITHIN THE PROPER PERIOD UNDER 
UTAH LAW 
The language of § 78-14-8, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended) makes it clear that during the 90 day period beginning 
with service of the notice, an action cannot be initiated against 
the health care provider. It is unarguable that this is a 90 day 
statutory prohibition which must be met before an action can be 
initiated. The construction of this statute urged by the responder 
is that since the Complaint was filed more than 90 days after the 
service of notice (at which time more than two years have elapsed 
since Mrs. Millett's last operation) such facts conclusively ban 
the action under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. However, 
such construction would violate the clear expression of the Legis· 
lature found in § 78-12-41, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
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This provision first adopted in 1943 provides: 
When the commencement of an action is 
stayed by ... statutory prohibition the 
time of the continuance of the ... pro-
hibition is not part of the time limited 
for the commencement of the action. 
In effect, then, § 78-12-41, which deals with all limitations of 
actions, prevents the 90 day period from being included in the 
running of the two year limitation period. 
Appellant contends that her cause of action did not 
arise until she was aware of her claim and that such awareness 
occurred after her second surgery which was performed on November 2, 
1976. The two year statute of limitations (§ 78-14-4) was tolled 
for a period of 90 days or was tolled until November 17, 1978, 
(§ 78-12-41) because of the requirement to give notice, The 90 day 
extension period would then begin to run on November 17, 1978 and 
expire on February 17, 1979 .. Clearly then the Complaint was timely 
filed. 
The only court known to have addressed itself to this 
issue is a California Appeals Court in Gomez v. Valley View 
Sanitorium, 151 Cal.Rptr. 97 (Cal.App. 1978). The operative facts 
presented there were substantially identical to the present case. 
The injury, a wrongful death, was on February 5, 1976. Under an 
identical 90 day notice requirement in California, the plaintiff 
gave such notice to the health care provider on November 26, 1976. 
The applicable statute of limitations was one year. Therefore, the 
-3-
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notice was given within 90 days of the normal expiration of the 
one year period. The California statutes also included a pro-
vision identical to § 78-12-41. The Court held: 
As we construe the applicable statutes, 
plaintiff's action was timely filed. 
By its terms, Code of Civil Procedure 
section 364 subdivision (a) prohibits 
the commencement of an action for medical 
malpractice for a period of 90 days follow-
ing service of a notice such an action 
would be filed. Where, as here, notice is 
served within 90 days of the running of the 
statute, the period of limitations is 
extended. Incongruously, section 364 pro-
hibits the commencement of the action within 
the period of limitations as extended. 
Section 364 however, does not self-destruct, 
because Code of Civil Procedure section 356 
provides: 
"When the commencement of an action is 
stayed by ... statutory prohibition, the 
time of the continuance of the ... prohibition 
is not part of the time limited for the commence-
ment of the action." 
Because Code of Civil Procedure section 364 
prohibits the commencement of an action until 
90 days have expired when a plaintiff serves 
the required notice of intention to commence 
it, that 90-day period must be excluded when 
calculating the applicable statute of limita-
tions. Where section 364 also operates to 
extend the period of limitations because notice 
is served within 90 days of the expiration of 
the statute, the plaintiff is entitled to that 
extension as well as the tolling of the statute 
during the 90 days plaintiff is prohibited from 
filing his action. 
151 Cal.Rptr. at 98. 
Note that even if the appellant's claim arose on 
September 26, 1976, the date of the first operation, the approach 
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used by the court in ~ would extend the two year limitation 
period to March 30, 1979 (90 days from November 17, 1978 plus 
the 41 days between August 17 and September 26, 1978). This 
would be well within the date of actual filing which was on 
January 18, 1979. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant's Complaint 
was timely filed, and the district court's Order of Dismissal 
was in error and should therefore be REVERSED. 
DATED this lOth day of September, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANTHONY M. THURBER 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
211 East Broadway, #213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant were personally served upon R.M. 
Child, attorney for Defendant-Respondent, at 1105 Continental 
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this ____ day of September, 
1979. 
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